Uncategorized – ACAP https://acap-solutions.com American Comprehensive Assessment and Planning Solution Wed, 27 Aug 2025 11:01:54 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9.1 https://acap-solutions.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/cropped-American-Comprehensive-Assessment-and-Planning-Solutions-without-background-1-32x32.png Uncategorized – ACAP https://acap-solutions.com 32 32 Simplifying Emergency Response https://acap-solutions.com/simplifying-emergency-response/ Wed, 27 Aug 2025 11:03:52 +0000 https://acap-solutions.com/?p=2313 Do you have standard terms or Simplified Response?  Many organizations are working to “stake a claim” in the “active shooter” response.  A few of these even expand to emergency response, incorporating commands for other scenarios.  Yet when working on proper terminology, consideration should be given to many aspects.  Most importantly, these include:  Research & lessons […]

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Do you have standard terms or Simplified Response? 

Many organizations are working to “stake a claim” in the “active shooter” response.  A few of these even expand to emergency response, incorporating commands for other scenarios.  Yet when working on proper terminology, consideration should be given to many aspects.  Most importantly, these include: 

  • Research & lessons learned from events 
  • 9/11 lessons  
  • Radio / auditory issues 
  • Color coding (& color blindness) 
  • Historic relevance 
  • Steps of different responses 

Research & Experience 

  • Experience shows us most staff are overwhelmed by the “playbook” approach 
  • Research shows us people are not prepared / response can be generalized / generalization = action = lives saved 

In the many schools that we have worked with, asking staff about their individual response to an example emergency usually resulted in “um”.  In schools with multi-tabbed Emergency Booklets (the plastic covered, spiral bound notebooks), many staff would point to the book – then get lost flipping pages.  When asked to explain what steps they might take, “I think” and “I might” were common responses. 

Research Across emergencies, previous research has shown that an average of 75% of individuals remain inactive when facing danger (Leach, 2004; Mawson, 2005).  This inactivity can be labeled as “freezing,” where an individual is passive, standing still, and potentially, not evacuating even if the opportunity presents itself.  However, research has also shown that individuals can decrease “freezing” by engaging in training and rehearsal of appropriate response behaviors (Leach, 2004; Noto et al., 2024). 

 

9/11 lessons 

  • Plain language is necessary 

The attack on the World Trade Center, September 11, 2001 was a tragedy, for the lives lost directly in the attack and for the lives lost through rescue efforts.  There were many lessons learned through those events, which should not be forgotten.  Most relevant here are the lessons of “10 codes”.  Every agency in the region responded to the World Trade Center that day, each brining with them their own “language” in the form of abbreviations (cops and teachers love their acronyms) and codes (10-4 is only one of 100 codes, and even that isn’t universal).  The connection here is that simple words which have standard or universal meaning are important for clear communication. 

 

Radio/auditory 

  • DISTINCT words, readily distinguished from each other to avoid mix-ups, are needed 
  • Research – words have meaning, so pick words that lead to the action to be taken 

Akin to the lessons of codes are the experiences of many users with garbled radio traffic.  Worse are old PA systems in schools, making Charlie Brown’s teacher sound good.  So using a few terms, widely different from each other, to direct emergency responses in mass communications means that everyone gets the same message.  Literally. 

Studies also shows that people follow the meaning of the words they hear.  This means that regardless of the training around terminology (which is needed), people are going to respond to the command words used.  This emphasizes the importance of using words that indicate the action taken.  Complicated terms like “reverse-evacuation” aren’t readily understood to direct movement.  Others like “lockdown”, especially when combined with qualifying terms “hard”, “soft”, etc., don’t always speak to what they intend (prison use is very different from what is intended in schools). 

 

Color coding 

  • ENS should have audio/visual response, including color 
  • Primary colors / ADA has screen provisions 

To further clarify message communication, each response can be given a color.  No one misses the bright white strobe of the fire alarms signaling to exit the building.  That flashing white light accompanies the auditory alarm – essential in loud areas (shops, gyms, and music rooms) areas with limited acoustic conveyance, and for those with hearing loss or impairment.  Using primary colors eliminates possible confusion or perception issues from color-blindness. 

 

History matters 

  • EXIT – pros: known, short, simple, understood, signs in place.  Cons: red, green, white 
  • LOCKDOWN – pros: ?  Cons: widely used – in many different ways (prison, military, lock-in, lockout, soft, hard), training (lay down and wait for rescue) vs. multi-option response, direction = no one moves, other? 

History, the long-term use of terms and directions, also matters.  “EXIT” signs have been required in buildings as long as fire alarms in many areas.  “Evacuation” signs are usually posted along designated highway routes in hurricane or tsunami areas.   

Similarly, the term “lockdown” has long been used in prisons and jails, which likely accounts for the transfer of the term to schools (police call for a school to close exterior doors by using the term they know).  However, going back to the lesson of plain language, what should be done is to notify the school of what is happening and let the school decide the response.  For example, police using K-9 units to track a subject near a school is a different response from an armed attacker at the school. 

 

Steps 

  • “playbook” vs. generalization 

Finally, our work has shown us that – no matter the emergency – the basic response steps are the same.  The same process can then be instructed to staff to be generalized, or used across multiple scenarios.  Rather than a different set of directions for every conceivable emergency, this concept has been shown to increase efficiency, effectiveness, and expedite action, moving occupants more calmly to desired locations. 

There are plentiful considerations for simplified response.  We’re proud of the work we’ve done.  Reach out to us for more information.  And Stay Safe! 

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The Fallacy of “Secure Mode” https://acap-solutions.com/the-fallacy-of-secure-mode/ Wed, 27 Aug 2025 11:01:05 +0000 https://acap-solutions.com/?p=2310 One of the foremost needs in school safety should be to address the ongoing prevalent danger that “Secure Mode” presents.  There are many individuals and several organizations and companies that discuss or promote this terminology.  Unfortunately, it makes sense to those who are not considering the ramifications.    Considering the number of schools and school personnel […]

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One of the foremost needs in school safety should be to address the ongoing prevalent danger that “Secure Mode” presents. 

There are many individuals and several organizations and companies that discuss or promote this terminology.  Unfortunately, it makes sense to those who are not considering the ramifications.   

Considering the number of schools and school personnel that are willing to latch on to the term and command should begin to shed light on the issue.  Most schools have policies and directions to keep all exterior doors locked during the school day; many add to that by limiting access to certain entries, some even requesting authentication before granting entry. 

If such methods are truly effective, why then is “Secure Mode” needed?  Advocates say that it is a useful indication for “responsible parties” to verify the school’s security.  Therein lies the issue; “Secure Mode” itself tells everyone in the school that they will receive a warning before the school really needs to be secured.  Events have shown, repeatedly, that simply is not the case. 

Instead of providing an additional layer of protection, “Secure Mode” then does the opposite.  By including it in planning and preparation, by its mere existence, the message is conveyed that buildings do not fully need to be secured.  We either lock something or we don’t; there is no in between.  And since most of schools propped doors come from students, telling them that someone will check the doors as soon as the command is given is as good as giving them permission to do it, regardless of what policy says.   

Understandably, with schools having so many issues, they may want to be able to notify some staff of an issue so that certain (or all) doors will be checked.  Unless all staff are being told to check doors, then the building does not need an announcement.  These staff members may be contacted by other communication methods, or doors may be checked or verified by other means.  The “mode” can be eliminated and promotion of a continually secure building begun. 

The last conceivable argument for the “Secure Mode” is that many buildings don’t have air conditioning, so windows may be open and need to be secured.  While it is  debatable that those staff with windows open actually close them following such a command, the basic argument remains the same: schools should be secured to begin with.  If funding for building or room air conditioning and purifying units is not available, other means for providing secure ventilation – rather than a school announcement which causes more issues than it solves – need to be sought.  In other words, the real problem needs to be addressed, not glossed over or swept under the rug.  There are solutions for the ventilation issue, though none are as appealing as the thought they are not needed.  Ultimately, the arguments for “Secure Mode” whittle down to the reality that we are in a world where school building security is a necessity that must be addressed with preventative measures, not a reactive process which cannot provide any realistic protection. 

There is only one path forward: eliminating commands and notifications for securing a facility and providing instructions and training to all occupants on the processes for making it happen.  Everyone in the building needs to understand they have a part in making their school safe.  They may not prop the door, but they may be thankful for someone who did; they may not use the propped door, but they may know who did and not scold or report them; they may not know who propped the door, but may not remove the object holding it open.  Everyone is responsible; everyone takes part in school safety or no one is safe.  This is the sad reality of today and no terminology will change that. 

Is your school secure or does it wait for a “Mode”? 

 

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Moving Beyond “Run-Hide-Fight” https://acap-solutions.com/moving-beyond-run-hide-fight/ Wed, 27 Aug 2025 10:54:44 +0000 https://acap-solutions.com/?p=2306 By Jackie Noto, BCBA  When an emergency scenario occurs, staff and students are most likely to follow the behaviors displayed by leaders and, therefore, having a plan is imperative (DHS, 2018). Across emergencies, previous research has shown that an average of 75% of individuals remain inactive when facing danger (Leach, 2004; Mawson, 2005). This inactivity […]

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By Jackie Noto, BCBA 

When an emergency scenario occurs, staff and students are most likely to follow the behaviors displayed by leaders and, therefore, having a plan is imperative (DHS, 2018). Across emergencies, previous research has shown that an average of 75% of individuals remain inactive when facing danger (Leach, 2004; Mawson, 2005). This inactivity can be labeled as “freezing,” where an individual is passive, standing still, and potentially, not evacuating even if the opportunity presents itself. However, research has also shown that individuals can decrease “freezing” by engaging in training and rehearsal of appropriate response behaviors (Leach, 2004; Noto et al., 2024). Having the ability to rehearse responses to emergency scenarios is imperative as learners are granted the opportunity to practice in a low-consequence environment. Some research has shown that individuals in active training (component of movement or rehearsal) have an increased likelihood of accurate responses in training compared to those who experience passive training (e.g., lectures, videos; Noto et al., 2024). Active training, specifically providing instructions, models, rehearsal opportunities, and feedback, has also been effective at generalizing to real-world scenarios regarding safety (Bergstrom et al., 2014; Garcia et al., 2016; Himle, et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2006; Miltenberger et al., 2004). By having learners engage in the expected behaviors across emergencies, not only do they get additional physical practice, but they can further increase their awareness of respective alerting verbiage, or command terms.  

When creating command terms, it is beneficial to consider the context of the scenario. Stress exposure training research has identified that extreme levels of stress may lead to inferior performance or counterproductive reactions, such as decreased fine-motor skills or increased response time to verbal behavior (Driskell & Johnston, 1998; Grossman & Christensen, 2007). Therefore, clear command terms and instructions will help to set performers up for success. When setting up command terms, selecting verbiage rooted in specific behaviors can be helpful in setting up clear expectations.  

For example, let’s review the responses often used in active shooter scenarios and identify alternatives that label the true behavior expected of staff. Beginning with the term, “run.” If individuals are choosing to evacuate a location, they need to ensure that it is safe to do so. Therefore, they should not only run, but also continually check for any danger or change in circumstances. A replacement term that meets both of those characteristics? “Avoid.” When avoiding, individuals are removing themselves from a situation but further ensuring that they do not recontact the threat. The term “hide” is often used when responding to active shooter scenarios, but is hide truly the behavior being sought out? Unfortunately, as previously seen in active shooting scenarios, like Columbine High School, hiding is not enough to keep oneself, or students safe. Instead of hide, a term like “barricade” aids in clarifying the expectations of this response. Barricade infers that there needs to be some form of blockade separating the class from the threat. With the verbiage of barricade, the expectations of response are further elucidated. This leaves “fight.” With any level of active shooter training, the phrase “you should never seek out a fight” has likely been included. That is the exact difficulty with this label – individuals should not be seeking a fight. The question arises, what should individuals do? The expectation of individuals is that if the threat were to breach their safety zone (i.e., opening the door, opening the window), they would counter the intruder, whether that be via physical contact, verbal distraction, or other alternative means. Therefore, a term like “counter” would remind the individual that they are not seeking a fight but opposing or preventing a threat if needed. 

Beyond alert terminology, the instructions selected can aid in reducing the phenomenon of freezing. Selecting a common set of introductory behaviors can increase the likelihood of engaging in behavior. If the first responses across any emergency scenario are standardized, no decision-making is needed to begin moving. Examples of initial behaviors across emergency scenarios include, but are not limited to, locating the go-kit, removing it from storage, checking the communication device, instructing students to listen for the next set of directions, and checking for safety. Through training, learners would begin each emergency with said preliminary behaviors. Through this increased practice, if a scenario were to occur, the learner would have the most practice with preliminary behaviors, thereby increasing the likelihood that behavior occurs. Additionally, if a scenario that was not covered in training were to occur, learners could generalize the same preliminary behaviors to a novel emergency. Extending beyond their initial behavior, as deemed by Newton’s Laws of Motion, an object in motion stays in motion. In other words, if individuals begin to engage in responses to the emergency, they are likely to continue to act. 

The standardization of instructions can also be beneficial to ensure that educators engage in all necessary follow-through behaviors after an incident. The aftermath of any emergency is stressful, whether that be perpetuated by a human or nature. Providing a consistent set of “next step” behaviors will address what information is needed after an emergency. Examples of follow-through behaviors across emergency scenarios include, but are not limited to, accounting for the individuals in one’s group, identifying who is present and absent, identifying who needs medical attention, communicating the group’s status with the person in charge. By instructing, modeling, and rehearsing these steps with learners, educators will know how to respond when safe, what information should be collected, and have context as to the full operation of the system. Hopefully, practice of follow-through behaviors would decrease the flooding of calls to administrators. This is helpful because at the same time educators are collecting information, principals and superintendents can continue engaging in important conversations and planning with emergency response personnel. 

In conclusion, preparing educators for emergency scenarios is imperative. With active training, the likelihood of engaging in effective response behaviors increases while the likelihood of “freezing” is reduced. With the use of active training, educators can develop muscle memory, but beyond, feel empowered in their ability to respond in a true emergency. To further improve preparedness, training should include carefully selected command terms rooted in specific behaviors, and standardized initial and follow-through responses. Clear, practiced expectations will lead to action. Utilizing this approach, schools can create a culture of readiness, ensuring that individuals are equipped to navigate crises. 

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Considerations from the Review of the Oxford Shooting https://acap-solutions.com/considerations-from-the-review-of-the-oxford-shooting/ Thu, 01 Feb 2024 02:09:32 +0000 https://acap-solutions.com/?p=2097 After reading through the report discussing the events leading up to and occurring during the attack at Oxford high school, including the findings of the authors, providing commentary from a school-based, multi-disciplinary group seemed necessary. This paper addresses points of concern with that publication in several areas: expectations, perspective, bag searches, camera monitoring, training, suicide and threat assessment, and omissions. It then concludes with suggestions for districts in their approach to school safety.

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ACAP Solutions

Considerations from the Review of the Oxford Shooting

Expert Insights

     After reading through the report discussing the events leading up to and occurring during the attack at Oxford high school, including the findings of the authors, providing commentary from a school-based, multi-disciplinary group seemed necessary.  This paper addresses points of concern with that publication in several areas: expectations, perspective, bag searches, camera monitoring, training, suicide and threat assessment, and omissions.  It then concludes with suggestions for districts in their approach to school safety.

     As a school-safety-focused group, our greatest concern with this document is that of expectations for performance and implementation which it sets forth on all those involved in the school.  In the overall publication, all expectations are set without providing a foundation for where those came from; were these the expectations from the reviewing company representatives, or were these expectations provided to the individuals, and if so, how were they given this expectation.  At the individual level, any expectation – which there are many outlined in the report – to supersede the authority given them and initiate actions beyond the scope of their standard practice is unreasonable, save where notification of that expectation can be shown.  No indication that such documentation was found is given in this report.

     Michigan state law mandates that schools provide for the safety and mental health of their students.  School Boards thus have the responsibility to create policy to carry out these mandates. Similarly, superintendents’ contracts generally specify enacting programs and methodologies to   carry out those policies.  However, without documentation showing that the Oxford High School (OHS) administrators, much less their staff, were notified of a responsibility for knowing and implementing the board policy, it is unrealistic and improper to hold them accountable to such a standard. Furthermore, any individual or administrator implementing programs without Board   approval would not be protected from any claims of wrongdoing and would open themselves to sanction for their actions.  Many people, especially in education, are wary of taking initiative because of similar worries. 

     Addressing the admonition claiming building administrators should have taken it upon themselves to engage threat assessment procedures goes further.  Public education continually runs on a shoestring-budget, with minimal allowances for spending at the building level, especially where district matters are concerned.  Thus, beyond the problematic expectation of insubordination, the restrictions of funding the project remain.

     More restrictive than finances are the limitations put on an educator’s time.  Regardless of the position, educators have more mandates for services than time allows, so the few options for anything else, including training, are limited.  To provide for training, not only must the training be approved, scheduled, and paid for, someone must also fill the position of the person leaving for training.  This requires additional staff or substitutes or at the very least, overtime hours, requiring contract allowance, human resources approval, and funding; so the entire proposal becomes a loop of problems.

     Moving to the broader application of the school as a whole, the problems listed here apply similarly.  To expect that every district, of its own accord, would fully implement a comprehensive threat assessment program – inclusive of every step, documentation, and sufficiently trained staff – without appropriate state and federal direction and support (which our education system does not have) is ludicrous.  That the information was available is not in question, nor is the validity of the National Threat Assessment Center’s work in creating a process.  However, having worked in schools since 2018, well before this massacre, we are familiar with the choices schools have to make between educational services and anything else.  While not easy, especially where safety and mental health are concerned, education is the primary mandate and focus of efforts and expenditures.

     All of this raises the issue of perspective.  Certainly the background of those writing the report is not in question: their expertise in security and prosecution is noteworthy.  However, the school environment is unique, presenting issues and concerns in a myriad of options unlike those of business; so much so that pre-school safety is different from secondary school safety and both different from university safety.  The problems of the education industry: funding, implementation, authority, knowledge, staffing, providing for minors, dealing with parents, the rights of both, contractual provisions and limitations, mental health, training, and many others, differ significantly from private industry and so solutions require special approaches.

     In this writing, the authors are clearly knowledgeable in matters of security and investigation.  While questioning the findings presented by those authors is a portion of the purpose of this writing, perhaps it is the perspective of their approach that is more relevant.  Where the authors commonly deal with private entities, where decisions can be made quickly and every position connected to implementation of policies are responsible for doing so, schools are a very different environment in which to apply safety and security measures.  As Idaho School Safety and Security Regional Lead Guy Bliesner says, “high schools are like small cities where the entire population moves every hour.”  Thus, their findings would be completely appropriate in another venue, though they do not apply here in the same way.

     In our society, problems are usually addressed so readily that the process of doing so is often overlooked.  It is one thing to identify the problem, another to find solutions (reviewing data on possibilities, vendor vetting, administrative and board approval), yet another to fund those solutions, and another to implement them (policy and procedure creation, with training and support), and finally another to maintain those solutions (this requires initial training of new staff and ongoing training of current staff, program support and administrative review). In schools, all of these steps have been an issue, especially with safety matters; this is not to say that schools do not care, they    simply do not have what is needed for them to work through the process of resolving safety concerns.

  Inarguably, in this incident, there were issues.  The perspective of which the events are viewed, however, changes whom is held accountable.  Consider only the matter of funding (setting aside issues of staffing, institutional requirements, contracts, training availability and the like): in the first three months following the Oklahoma City bombing, the federal government allocated $95 million to improve federal buildings, almost three-times what it offered schools nationally following Parkland; comparatively, the U.S. Congress allocated $75 million in school safety grants for fiscal year 2018 and $100 million for fiscal years 2019 through 2028.*1  Much (if not all) of this money was allocated to states and their agencies, not to schools themselves.  The Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services has also announced nearly $50 million in school safety funding through its School Violence Prevention Program (SVPP).*2  In Michigan, money was issued to individual districts through the Competitive Safe Schools Grant Program, administered by the Michigan State Police.  While leading the Michigan School Safety Task Force in 2018, whose final report advocated Comprehensive School Safety Planning, the organization’s grant approvals followed the tradition of physical security improvements, not providing for much of what is cited in the report, nor providing standardly for all schools across the state.  As a result, local school districts were – and are – left to their own determination of solutions and their communities for funding the chosen avenues.

   The report further made specific critiques regarding some of the physical security measures and responses to the crisis.  As Oxford High School (OHS) had more security measures than were readily available in the vast majority of districts in Michigan, this response will focus on the discussions of bag searches and camera monitoring.

  As recent incidents in Newport News, Virginia*3, and Denver, Colorado*4 show, searching bags or backpacks at schools is not an automatic guarantee to prevent school shootings.  Shooters may use the search as the initiative to attack.  Those conducting the search must be properly trained to do the search, as well as be thorough in the search.  Staffing must be provided for searching, as searching must be applied to all students meeting the criteria.  Of course, school districts must outline that policy and designate which staff will make the determination and which staff will search.

   As school staff are frequently criticized for their actions, consideration for human behavior must also enter the picture. Behaviors likely to have immediate or certain consequences have greater engagement than behaviors with future or uncertain consequence.  When considering searching a student or their belongings, it is human nature for school employees to worry about what will happen as a result of their search; given that the likelihood of parental complaint or even lawsuit is high, while that of a school shooting is low, people will be inclined not to search.  Clear direction, administrative involvement, board policy, training and support are all needed to expect actions differing from that inclination.

  The immediate search is complicated by other factors as well.  If security is lacking at the building outside of the school day, the opportunity for attack in those hours, or the use of that time for preparation for a school day attack, can lessen the reason for school day searching.  The policy on searches – especially regarding indirect cases such as this – and instructions for process in making the determination to search, the frequency of similar searches, the familiarity of the staff member with searching, the availability of support for the staff member and that person’s familiarity with searches, the tools available to be used in the search and staff training and familiarity with them; these are all additional considerations for searching.  In this report, only the schools’ use of searching students for vapes is mentioned, without addressing individual familiarity and training.

  The report also gives extensive criticism of OHS staff for not monitoring cameras during the incident and providing announcements of the murderer’s location and actions, citing the acronym under which the training given to the school staff is commonly known. However, the specific training provided to OHS staff was not reviewed, nor were the consequences of such an implementation discussed.  Training in any activity is always an issue with school staff, as their time is so limited and opportunities for training are scarce.  In general, when active violence training is provided to schools, it is in lecture format (“sit-and-get”), limiting retention.  Due to time restrictions, such training is usually focused on “Run-Hide-Fight” responses to active shooters.  As   the training provisions for OHS were not included in the report, these concerns linger.

   This training provision is more poignant in relation to the announcing staff.  As which staff would be responsible for the camera monitoring and announcements are not specified in the report, clear direction on who should do this and how it should be done were likely not found by the authors.  As schools are just beginning to grasp the implementation of “Run-Hide-Fight” (Avoid-   Barricade-Combat are terms which provide more clarity) and – for a plethora of reasons, whether   arguably valid or not – there is limited training on the basics, much less the complicated aspects of active violence survival, the expectation that school staff would be prepared to engage in such action is exceptional now, and bordered on unrealistic in 2021.  Further, to accomplish these announcements, school staff would need the wherewithal to calmly operate the relevant systems in the most traumatic life-threatening emergency conceivable.  This is an unlikely expectation at best. 

   As school safety consultants ourselves, we must consider the ramifications of suggestions we make or contest.  As such, if a school were to provide the direction to staff to engage in such action, there are components of implementation that must accompany the training and practice which would be necessary.  This would begin by engaging in the announcement for every emergency and drill, not just active shooter, as should be the case with emergency practices.  Next, the technological components of cameras, monitors and public address systems must be in place and fully functioning.  As many schools have problems with their announcement systems, this is not a given factor.  The camera system must be able to cover all areas of the building and campus; given the cost for such systems, most schools have significant gaps.  Third, access to monitor the cameras must be given to enough people, with enough equipment, in enough locations, to ensure that access is available whenever the crisis occurs.  Also, staff must be trained to use the system, with enough equipment, to effectively follow the event anywhere on the campus.  While technology is available   to provide this information, it is rare to find in schools; regardless, the staff must then also be able to share the location through the announcement.  Finally, this must all be provided in locations which    increase the safety of those expected to make the announcement, with consideration given that this may cause an attacker to focus on the office and announcing staff.  Not providing for these foreseeable issues causes further complications and liability.

   The issue of suicide assessment and Behavioral Threat Assessment and Management, the provision for them in schools, training, use, documentation and support is addressed in the report. Thanks to Oxford Community Schools’ use of a third-party policy provider a thorough policy was available and, according to press conferences, adopted in 2004, with an update in 2011 reflecting the best information available currently. The report correctly notes the obvious gap between the policy and practical implementation.  The challenge when using third-party policy provisions is in reviewing each and every policy that is adopted.  According to press conferences, this was not done, both by board members and the superintendent at the time of adoption or at the time of the incident.

   However, the report not only blames these individuals for not implementing this policy, it further assigns responsibility to everyone who had assigned contact with the attacker.  Yet there is no documentation given to indicate those staff had such expectations defined for them. Such direction needs to be clearly stated and verified to demonstrate accountability.  If this was done, training and process would need to be provided through the district, also with documentation, none of which is noted in the report.

   The federal Safe Schools Initiative, post-Columbine, had several recommendations for schools; many are not implemented due to the time, money, and effort they would require, as no provisions have been made via state or federal government policy or funding for the schools to do so.  “There are people with the background, knowledge, experience, and expertise who should be providing the direction – and steps to take – to schools.” *5    Where states like Virginia or North Carolina made this a portion of the education process early on, and states like Maine have created   state programs to provide training and support (schools must still choose to take the training, select staff and send them to sessions), Michigan only began initial efforts after the attack at Oxford. “Schools are doing threat assessment constantly, informally or formally; they need assistance in the understanding, standardization, and documentation of the analysis and efforts.” *6

   There is no indication in the report that guidelines were promulgated, that process was conveyed to staff, certainly where BTAM was concerned.  There is no indication that training was or was not provided staff responsible for identifying and assessing concerning behaviors.  That training in general was not addressed in the report seems a drastic oversight.  It is essential to every staff expectation noted in the report.

   A further omission in the report was referenced in press conferences: the findings of a previous third-party threat or risk assessment.  This was not included in either of the reports issued this year, a deviation from standard practice; conducting an assessment always provides notation of improvements or declinations.  Whether such an assessment considered these policies, whether implementation of the policies was included, and most certainly the findings of the assessment, whatever it entailed, along with any suggestions or recommendations, are relevant information and provide perspective to the actions of OCS and staff.

   Schools and school staff have more mandates on activities than time allows them to complete.  While school safety matters to them, this results in seeking a “silver bullet”: looking to spend what little money they have on the latest and greatest product to minimize impact and achieve safety.  As educators, not safety experts, they are too distracted sorting through the offers of solutions and not asking what they should engage in.

  
   The solutions to school safety are myriad and complex, as evidenced by this attack at a school which was generally ahead of Michigan schools in security matters.  As an organization promoting Comprehensive School Safety Planning, we received widespread support in every conversation with school administrators.  However, they were then faced with the choice to spend district funds on safety items and consulting or educational items; there was little choice for them to make: they needed to follow their mandate.

   As the funding for school safety assessments and per pupil safety funding was standardized, schools readily engaged in the safety process.  This is the first and foremost indication that it should be a standard.  If the desire is to create equal educational opportunities across the country regardless of community affluence or location, this should begin with state and federal funding for 21st-century buildings, redesigned with technology and safety as primary considerations.  Most schools are struggling to maintain structures originally build in the 1950s; they cannot continue to cover the operational costs and fund appropriate new structures.

For schools, this review of the findings at Oxford can be summarized in several bullet points:

  • School safety does not come from a device or even a secure building; it takes a comprehensive plan that involves everyone connected to the school.
  • Implementation of a comprehensive school safety plan takes expertise, authority and dedication of resources, given in the appropriate perspective for the school and community.

  • Policies should be reviewed to be appropriate and implemented.

  • Risk assessments do not create liability – they point out areas to seek solutions. Schools are responsible to show action to address the issues found.

  • Devices and programs should not be instituted without consideration of the comprehensive engagement and effect for overall school safety.  This means:

    • There are no single-source solutions: no one device, tool, technology, program, process or person is the answer to making schools safe.

    • Clear backpacks, backpack searches, no backpacks, or allowing backpacks must be given due consideration in the implementation, effect, challenges, and desired environment of the comprehensive school safety plan.

    • Response programs, protocols, and assigned actions must be discussed thoroughly, to include the staff and structure, and evaluated and improved through scenarios.

    • BTAM and suicide assessment are not new methodologies, though they are new to some staff.  Implementation should be part of district-wide safety plans, including standard training, documentation and support.

  • BTAM and suicide assessment, along with information gathering and sharing, should be standardized throughout the district (state and country)
  • Training is not an option.
    • In every expectation, people need to know the expected behavior and have that expectation clarified through training.

    • Crisis will happen to everyone in some form at some point in their life. Studies show that people do not enter “fight or flight” but “fight, flight, or freeze” *7.  The way to overcome the tendency to freeze is to train.

Footnotes:

  1. https://rollcall.com/2019/03/25/congresssetaside-1-billionafterparklandnowschoolsarestartingtouseit/

  2. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departmentjusticeawardsnearly-50-milliongrantsimproveschoolsafety

  3. Parents wonder how 6-year-old Virginia boy shot teacher after his backpack was searched (nbcnews.com)

  4. 2 school employees shot by student who was required to be patted down each day: Police – ABC News (go.com)

  5. Jackie Noto, CBAC; interview 12/19/2023

  6. Dr. Karen Barnes, clinical therapist; Threat Assessment/Mental Heath Coordinator at Maine School Safety Center/ Maine Department of Education; interview 12/19/2023

  7. Noto, J.M. (2019) Behavioral skills training for active shooter scenarios: Human service staff (Publication No. 135) [Master’s Thesis, Florida Institute of Technology]. Theses and Dissertationshttps://repository.fit.edu/etd/135

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